Detecting Sybil attacks in vehicular networks by unknown
Al-Mutaz et al. Journal of Trust Management 2014, 1:4
http://www.journaloftrustmanagement.com/content/1/1/4
RESEARCH Open Access
Detecting Sybil attacks in vehicular networks
Muhammad Al-Mutaz, Levi Malott* and Sriram Chellappan
*Correspondence: lmnn3@mst.edu
Department of Computer Science,
Missouri University of Science and
Technology, Rolla, MO (65401), USA
Abstract
A Sybil attack consists of an adversary assuming multiple identities to defeat the trust of
an existing reputation system. When Sybil attacks are launched in vehicular networks,
the mobility of vehicles increases the difficulty of identifying the malicious vehicle
location. In this paper, a novel protocol for Sybil detection in vehicular networks is
presented. Considering that vehicular networks are cyber-physical systems, the
technique exploits well grounded results in the physical (i.e., transportation) domain to
detect the Sybil attacks in the cyber domain. Compared to existing works that rely on
additional cyber hardware support, or complex cryptographic primitives for Sybil
detection, the protocol leverages the theory of platoon dispersion that models the
physics of naturally occurring vehicle dispersion. Specifically, the proposed technique
employs a certain number of roadside units that periodically collect reports from
vehicles regarding their physical neighborhood. Leveraging from existing models of
platoon dispersion, a protocol was designed to detect anomalously close
neighborhoods that are reflective of Sybil attacks. To the best of the authors’
knowledge, this paper is unique in integrating a well established theory in
transportation engineering for detecting cyber space attacks in vehicular networks.
The resulting protocol is simple, efficient, and robust in diverse attack environments.
Keywords: Vehicle-to-vehicle; Vehicle-to-infrastructure; Platoon dispersion;
Sybil; Detection
Background and literature review
Introduction
Organizations in many countries today are investing in vehicular networks to leverage
wireless networking support to improve state-of-the-art in road transportation. The US
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has allocated 75 MHz of spectrum in the
5.9GHz band for Dedicated Short Range Communications, a set of protocols and stan-
dards for short to medium-range wireless communication for automotive use. Some
recent vehicular networking efforts are the USDOT’s Vehicle Infrastructure Integration
(VII), which is a cooperative initiative between USDOT and automobile manufacturers,
focusing on feasibility of deploying communications systems for safety and efficiency of
road transportation systems. The ERTICO partnership is a multi-sector partnership pur-
suing development and deployment of Intelligent Transport Systems across Europe. Apart
from these efforts, a variety of VANET test-beds have been set up in academia also for
basic research and development of services.
This paper addresses a critical and emerging security problem in vehicular networks,
namely detecting the presence of Sybil attacks. Sybil attacks are classified as an attack on
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the trust of a peer-to-peer system by an attacker assuming many pseudonymous iden-
tities. Using these identities, the attacker can gain a disproportionately large influence
on system functionality. In vehicular networks, the presence of a Sybil attack can have
negative consequences. For instance, in an application like road safety, consider a single
malicious vehicle, VM, assuming a large number of fake identities incorrectly report-
ing road conditions. Other benign vehicles will tend to believe such a message, since it
appears to be coming from multiple vehicles, and may adjust their routes. In such a case
VM can potentially obtain exclusive access to the road, which it otherwise could not. A
number of other applications like content exchange, intelligent traffic signalling, and ramp
metering can all be compromised in the presence of Sybil attacks. Unlike static networks
like the Internet, vehicular mobilities make Sybil detection very difficult with the added
spatio-temporal constraints.
Relatedwork
The problem of detection Sybil attacks in VANETs has been previously studied. In [1]
and [2], the proposed solution detects Sybil attacks when vehicles may only hold one
valid pseudonym at a time. When a pseudonym need to be refreshed, a new pseudonym
is obtained from a trusted Road-Side Unit (RSU). The consequence of this approach is a
possibly complex pseudonym allocation mechanism implemented by the RSU network.
Another technique leverages directional antennas to identify the location/direction of
message arrival [3]. A vehicle launching a Sybil attack will likely be detected as many
messageswill arrive from the location/direction.However, in dense networks, localization
errors can lead to frequent false positives. This scheme may be compromised as a smart
attacker may use directional antennas to mislead its neighbors about its direction.
In [4], heavy-weight cryptographic techniques are leveraged for detecting Sybil attacks
in VANETs. Specifically, each vehicle is given a list of pseudonyms to protect their privacy
during communication. However, the pseudonyms of each vehicle are designed in such a
manner wherein they are all hashed to a common value. By calculating the hashed values
at Road Side Units, a central server can determine whether or not certain pseudonyms
came from the same pool. Sybil attacks are detected if many pseudonyms from the same
pool are detected in a short interval of time. Unfortunately, the computational complexity
of cryptographic protocols in this technique is quite high.
In [5], GPS and RSSI signal measurements are used for detecting Sybil nodes. The
proposed scheme uses Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communications to confirm reported
positions of vehicles by referencing the RSSI measurements. To correct inaccuracies aris-
ing from RSSI measurement, caused by vehicle mobility, traffic patterns and support from
roadside base stations are used. Specifically, statistical algorithms are implemented to ver-
ify the signal strength distribution of a suspect vehicle over time to significantly reduce
the detection rate. In [6], analysis is performed to quantify performance of Sybil detection
under assumptions like transmission range, antenna model, signal strength etc. Unfor-
tunately, the un-reliability of RSSI measurements limits the practical reliability of these
techniques [7]. In [8], inability of multiple vehicles to exhibit close temporal and spa-
tial correlations at multiple locations is exploited for Sybil defense. The idea is to have
RSUs sign location and timestamp information for vehicles as they move. Upon detecting
groups of vehicles having many similar locations with similar timestamps, a Sybil attack
is detected. The overhead in this scheme though is quite high, especially in the case of
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urban networks. Significant cryptographic overhead is incurred as RSUs have to sign each
received message.
We also would like to point out two other areas of work that are also closely related
to our problem of Sybil attack detection in vehicular networks. The first area is secure
localization in wireless networks like sensor and mobile ad hoc networks [9,10], wherein
locations of nodes are determined in a secure manner. Our problem is similar, but orthog-
onal in the sense that we are attempting to verify integrity of relative location updates as
vehicles move in the network. The other area we wish to highlight is the issue of detecting
Sybil attacks and nodes in static networks like sensor, Internet scale, and social networks
[11-14]. As can be observed, while the goal of these works are related to ours, the issue of
vehicle mobility and unique mobility patterns of these nodes necessitates fundamentally
new approaches for Sybil detection, which we attempt in this paper.
Contributions
Presented in this paper is an innovative protocol for Sybil detection in vehicular net-
works. Vehicular networks today are examples of cyber physical systems, where there is a
clear integration of cyber and physical components. The premise of this paper starts with
two simple questions: Can the natural physics of the underlying transportation domain
be integrated with the Cyber domain in detecting Sybil attacks, and b) If so, can such an
integration generate high quality solutions to detect Sybil attacks, while alleviating com-
plexities (in the form of complex cryptography and additional hardware requirements) in
the cyber domain. This papers yields a positive response to both questions.
The technique employs a certain number of road side units (RSUs) that periodically
collect reports from communicating vehicles regarding this neighborhood. In the event
of a vehicle performing Sybil attacks, the geographic proximity the Sybil identities will
be long-term and repeating, while the geographical proximity of benign vehicles will
short-term. To put it in terms of transportation engineering, Sybil identities will appear
to “platoon” together, while identities of benign vehicles will eventually “disperse”. The
dispersion of vehicles in roads occurs due to a combination of road conditions, vehicle
dynamics and human factors. This theory has been extensively studied by transporta-
tion engineers in the last five decades in the form of a theory called “platoon dispersion”
[15-18]. Integrating platoon dispersion models provide an alternative method for Sybil
attack detection. To detect attacks, RSUs compare models of naturally occurring disper-
sion among benign vehicles with anomalously occurring platoons among Sybil nodes.
Using a combination of both theoretical analysis and simulations, the simplicity, effi-
ciency, practicality and quality of the protocol for Sybil detection in vehicular networks
is demonstrated. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this paper is unique in proposing
an inter-disciplinary approach for addressing cyber space attacks in emerging vehicular
networks.
Paper organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section ‘Platoon dispersion and its appli-
cation to Sybil detection’ presents a brief overview of platoon dispersion theory in trans-
portation engineering, and its application for Sybil detection in vehicular networks.
Section ‘Research design and methodology’ presents the formal attack model, problem
statement, overall framework, and protocol for Sybil detection. Section ‘Performance
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evaluations’ will demonstrate the performance of the protocol, and the paper concludes
in Section ‘Conclusions’ .
Platoon dispersion and its application to Sybil detection
Provided first is a brief overview of how models of dispersion among vehicles that
naturally occur in roads have been studied by transportation engineers. Afterwards, a
simplified example of how to use platoon dispersion theory for Sybil detection is pre-
sented. The discussions will help guide the proposed Sybil detection protocol discussed
in the next section.
Platoon dispersion theory in transportation engineering
A platoon is a group of vehicles traveling in close proximity for some amount of time as
shown in Figure 1. Ideally, consistent vehicle platooning is preferable and improves critical
transportation parameters like signal optimization, congestion avoidance, improved road
safety, and capacity [19-23]a. Under normal traffic, vehicle platooning is short-term.
Clearly, if all vehicles in an existing platoon are traveling at a constant speed, a platoon
will never disperse. However, due to physical factors like road friction, vehicle charac-
teristics and signalling, human factors, lane changes, and fatigue [24] cause platoons to
disperse over time. The longer the travel time between points the greater dispersion, due
to the difficulty of maintaining constant speed over longer time scales. This phenomena
is called platoon dispersion, a simple illustration of which is shown in Figure 2.
Platoon dispersion has been well studied in transportation engineering [15-17,25-31],
via two mathematical models. One is the (more popular) Robertson’s geometric distri-
bution model [16] and the other is the Pacey’s normal distribution model [15]. Both
models assume that road segment travel times follow some probability distribution.
The Robertson platoon dispersion model follows a shifted geometric series, and has
been implemented in traffic-simulation software like SCOOT [32], SATURN [33] and
TRAFLO [34]. The basic of Robertson recursive platoon dispersion model takes the
following form:
q′t = R · qt−Tmin + (1 − R) · q′t−δt . (1)
Figure 1 An eight-car platoon. Real-life example of eight cars in a platoon configuration.
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Figure 2 Formation and dispersion of platoons. Illustration describing the various states of vehicle
platoons.
R = 11 + αβTmean , where 0 ≤ R ≤ 1. (2)





R · (1 − R)i−Tmin · qt−i. (3)
where,
q′t : arrival flow at the downstream location at time t-T (veh/hr);
qt : departure flow at the upstream location at time t (veh/hr);
δt: time step duration;
Tmin: minimum travel time on the roadway;
Tmean: mean roadway travel time, measured in units of time steps.
α = 1−β
β
: dimensionless platoon dispersion factor depending on the level




2Tmean : dimensionless travel-time factor;
R : smoothing factor governing dispersion, where 0 ≤ R ≤ 1;
σ : the standard deviation of link travel time assuming individual
vehicle speeds follow normal distribution and are unchanged.
As can be seen from Equations 1, 2, 3 and definitions of parameters, all we need to
know are the speed deviations σ among vehicles, and the mean travel time Ta between
the upstream and downstream locations. If both can be determined (which is quite
straightforward to obtain), one could compute platoon dispersion factors α and β . These
parameters subsequently can be used to compute the smoothing factor R, from which
the degree of how an upstream platoon will disperse at the downstream location can be
computed.
Figure 3 shows an illustration of upstream platooning and its downstream disper-
sion, wherein the shaded portion represents similar vehicle speeds that tend to platoon
together, while non-shaded portion represents varying speeds of vehicles that disperse
from the original platoon. A numerical example of dispersion based on the Robertson
model [16-18] is shown in Figure 4. Each observation (i.e., downstream) point is one mile
apart, and the minimum travel time between each point is one minute. For small speed
deviations, the dispersion in expected number of vehicles reaching the observation point
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Figure 3 Illustration of platoon dispersionmodel.
is less than the case where the speed deviation increases. This leads to platoon sizes
decreasing, progressively, as vehicles travel from one observation point to another.
An illustrative example of Sybil detectionusing platoon dispersion
Consider a case where there are 50 vehicles in an upstream platoon. Let each vehicle have
a unique identity given by {V1,V2, . . . ,V50}. VehicleV50 is malicious and possesses 50 fake
identities
{
V¯1, V¯2, . . . , V¯50
}
. When all vehicle communicate with each other (including
V50 with all of its identities to launch a Sybil attack), the up-stream platoon will appear
to have 100 vehicles. With prior knowledge of road characteristics and (either currently
sampled or prior estimates of) vehicle speeds, the dispersion parameters and the expected
degree of dispersion at downstream can be computed. Say the smoothing factor is R =
20%. If the Sybil, V50, is part of the downstream platoon (recall shaded area in Figure 3),
the number of identities actually seen in the downstreamplatoon is nd = 0.20× 50 (benign
vehicle identities) + 50 Sybil identities = 60 identities. If the Sybil vehicle falls outside
of the downstream platoon (recall the non-shaded area in Figure 3), then the number of
identities actually seen in the downstream platoon is nd = 0.20 × 50 = 10 identities.
It is easy to see that abnormalities in the physical domain will manifest in the form of
abnormal platooning (and ensuing dispersion) under Sybil identities in cyber space. If all
Figure 4 Numerical example of platoon dispersion. Graph describing the decrease in platoon size as
platoons reach various road side units.
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the identities upstream (i.e. 100 of them) are benign, the number of vehicle identities in
the downstream platoon is expected to be nd = 0.20×100 = 20. Sufficient abnormalities
in platoon dispersion that are straightforward to determine leading to a natural, elegant,
and simple technique to detect Sybil attacks. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, such
a technique has not been attempted yet, and is formalized and elaborated in the next
section.
Research design andmethodology
In the previous section, a basic theory of platoon dispersion was illustrated, and how
in principle can be leveraged for detecting Sybil attacks in vehicular networks. In this
section, the protocol for detecting Sybil attacks via leveraging from platoon dispersion
is presented. Several practical challenges in the actual design and implementation of the
proposed protocol are addressed afterwards.
Vehicular network model
It is assumed that a certain number of Road Side Units (RSUs) are deployed in the vehic-
ular network. The RSUs can communicate with each other and vehicles on the road.
Communication is achieved through a 2-way radio, such as a DSRC (Dedicated Short
Range Communications), to send and receive messages to other vehicles and RSUs. Each
Vehicle Vx also has a unique identity that can identify it in the network. The identity for
each Vx also acts as a unique public key Px used for message encryption. Each vehicle
maintains a secure private key for decryption ofmessages. Since energy is not a constraint,
asymmetric encryption is feasible in vehicular networks [35]. Note that message confi-
dentiality and privacy are not emphasized in this paper. It is assumed that some system
exists for protecting confidentiality. If privacy is desired, techniques have been proposed
for utilizing temporal pseudonyms that expire after a certain time [36], or using local coor-
dination among vehicles and aggregating responses before forwarding messages. Such
techniques do preserve vehicle privacy, and their usage will not affect the proposed pro-
tocol. Furthermore, a Central Coordination Authority (CCA) is involved in coordination
among all RSUs, along with any key and pseudonym distribution among vehicles. The
CCA and RSUs are assumed to be trusted.
For the proposed protocol, RSUs must have some prior information about vehicles and
speed distributions along road segments. Such knowledge is reasonable and practical.
In many countries across the world, including the US, efforts are being made to esti-
mate vehicle densities and speed distributions for traffic management purposes. This is
acheived using a variety of modern equipment like road side sensors, traffic light cam-
eras and remote sensing imagery [37-40]. More discussion on this assumption and the
accuracy of estimates are detailed in the next subsection during the description of the
proposed protocol.
Simple attack model and problem definition
The attack model provides contextual information and elaborates the roles of the various
agents. The attacker intends to subvert the integrity of peer vehicle communications by
launching Sybil attacks. The attack has captured a certain number of legitimate identities
(or keys) belonging to other vehicles. Such an attack model is practical, powerful, and has
not been considered yet in related literature [1-6]. For example, a malicious parent could
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easily steal identities of multiple members of their family that have identities already pro-
visioned. Clearly with more sharing of vehicles today (e.g., rental cars and car pools), the
feasibility of skimming attacks in vehicles (or in related hardware) to steal identities is even
more practical. With multiple legitimate identities in hand, the potency of an attacker is
much higher. The mobile nature of vehicular networks makes detection of such identity
thefts quite difficult in practice. It is assumed that the attacker will utilize all its Sybil
identities to attack the network in an attempt subvert the network integrity. Note that
in this paper, we consider for simplicity one attacker in the network. The protocols we
propose can be directly applied to multiple (but non-colluding) attackers. Analyzing and
enhancing protocols for thwarting colluding attackers is part of future workb.
Given the attack model, the formal problem statement is to rapidly detect the presence
of Sybil attacks in a vehicular network.
Protocol 1 Protocol Executed by Each Vehicle Vx
1: Each Vehicle Vx Executes the Following Steps when traveling between RSUs
2: For every Vehicle Vy communicating with Vx
3: Store Vy
4: End For
5: Each Vehicle Vx Executes the Following Steps when in range of RSU
6: Forward Stored Vehicle Identities to RSU
Methods
Proposed technique for Sybil detection in vehicular networks
Overview
In Section Platoon dispersion and its application to Sybil detection, the basic overview
of platoon dispersion and how it can be leveraged in principle for Sybil detection was
presented. Unfortunately, there is one critical challenge to overcome before practical
Sybil attack detection via leveraging platoon dispersion. Recall from Section ‘Platoon
dispersion theory in transportation engineering’ that existing models for platoon dis-
persion assume that vehicle speeds from an upstream point to a downstream point are
unchanged. These speeds are then used to derive σ (which is used to derive Smoothing
Factor R in Equation 2), that subsequently determines dispersion phenomena. Anoma-
lies in the dispersion phenomena naturally provide an ideal foundation for detecting Sybil
attacks in theory. However, in practice, vehicle do not travel with constant speed and
speed can vary widely between vehicles. This is solved by using measurement samples
from peer vehicles and incorporating these data to determine platooning anomalies. A
high level of confidence of detecting Sybil attacks is possible through this method.
Protocols description and analysis
Protocols 1 and 2 executed by vehicles and RSUs, respectively, illustrate the proposed
technique for Sybil detection. As demonstrated in Protocol 1, each Vehicle Vx will store
the identities of all vehicles with which it has communicated when traveling between
RSUs. These identities are forwarded to an RSUwhen the vehicle is in range. Upon a vehi-
cle transmitting its internally stored list of other communicating vehicles, the list may be
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Protocol 2 Protocol Executed by Each Downstream RSU Rd
1: Inputs:
Definition of Platoon; Mean (μ∗N ) and Standard Deviation (σ ∗N ) of Travel Times forN
Vehicles in Upstream Platoon at Ru traveling to Rd based on Historical Information;


















of Sybil Detection ();
2: Upon Receiving Vehicle Ids (Yu) of a Platoon from Upstream RSU Ru
3: Denote N as Number of Received Identities
4: Wait for Minimum Travel Time (Tmin) between Location of Ru and Current
Location
5: Receive Identities from every Forwarding Vehicle
6: Denote Yd as Number of Vehicles Currently Platooning
7: Setm as Platoon Ratio (m = YdYu )














9: If 2 < FR(r = m) < 1 − 2
10: Flag No Sybil Attacks
11: Else
12: Flag the Detection of Sybil Attack
13: End If
14: Forward Current Platoon to Downstream RSU
deleted. Additionally, vehicles do not have to disclose their location for the protocol to
work.
Protocol 2 presents the steps executed by a downstreamRSU Rd for Sybil detection. The
inputs to the protocol are as follows. First, the Central Coordination Authority defines
what constitutes a platoon. One simple way to define a platoon is to say all vehicles cur-
rently within the communication range of an RSU is a platoon. Alternate definitions can
also exist depending on traffic models and does not change the protocol or its execution.
Second,Rd will have priormodels of vehicle densities and speed distributions from histor-
ical information. Such information can be obtained from a number of traffic management
organizations. These organizations regularly collect information on vehicle volumes, den-
sities, and speeds along road segments to improve congestion control, signalling, accident
management, and other traffic attributes. A number of recent studies also propose inno-
vative and accurate approaches to obtain such information including deployment of road
side sensors and remote sensing imagery to obtain such information [37-40].
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From such information, each RSU can derive the mean (μ∗N ) and standard deviation
(σ ∗N ) of vehicle travel time based on the number of vehicles N traveling from upstream.
Note that even if such information may be historical and may not reflect existing trends,
it is always possible to obtain samples in real-time from current traffic to build accurate
more profiles. Recall from Equation 2, that the smoothing factor R governing platoon
dispersion is given by R =
√
1+σ 2−1
2σ 2 , where σ is the standard deviation of link travel
time assuming individual vehicle speeds follow normal distribution and are unchanged.
To obtain σ , Equation 2 can be rewritten as σ =
√
1−R
R2 . In practice vehicle speeds and
link travel times on roads between RSUs fluctuate. Assuming the link travel times of each
vehicle follows normal distribution [41,42] with parameters μ∗N , σ ∗N , and N vehicles in an
upstream platoon, the probability density function (pdf) of σ is















































The final input to the protocol is the confidence interval () of Sybil Detection, that is
predetermined by the Central Coordination Authority.
Once Rd obtains the number of vehicles nd departing from Ru, it waits for Tmin, the
minimum travel time on the link. Ru starts receiving messages from vehicles regarding
identities they had communicated with. Based on times of messages received, Rd deter-
mines the number of vehicles in the current platoon as Z. It then computes the platoon
ratio asm = ZY and FR(r = m) from the CDF of the smoothing factor. There are two cases
of interest here. When the Sybil attacker is part of an upstream platoon and part of the
downstream platoon, the number of vehicles Yd in the downstreamplatoon will be abnor-
mally large as the Sybil identities will not disperse. In the second case, the Sybil vehicle
is not in the downstream platoon, causing the number of vehicles Yd in the downstream
platoon will be abnormally less. This is due to large number of Sybil identities being dis-
persed. In the first case, FR(r = m) will assume a large value as the platoon size will show
little relative change, and in the latter case FR(r = m) will assume a much smaller value as
the relative change in platoon size is high. This is captured in Step 9 of Protocol 2, where
abnormal platoons in both cases are checked to indicate a Sybil attack.
Results and discussion
Only a limited number of numerically obtained parameters are used in the execution
of the protocol. The critical parameters are μ∗N , σ ∗N and . When μ∗N is low, dispersion
is low. This means that the likelihood of vehicles platooning together is higher, hence
lowering the chances of detecting Sybil identities. On the other hand, σ ∗N denotes the
standard deviation or error in the estimation of link arrival time. If σ ∗N is low, then the
error in estimation of link arrival time is better, yielding a steeper CDF, which improves
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detection accuracy. The parameter  determines the degree of confidence in detection.
Finally, all of these parameters are integral to the attacker strength in terms of number of
Sybil nodes during detection. Next, the impacts of these parameters on the performance
of the protocol are detailed.
Performance evaluations
In this section, the performance evaluation of our protocol to detect Sybil attacks in
vehicular networks are reported. Section ‘Preliminaries’ presents preliminaries, while
Section ‘Analysis and simulation results’ illustrates performance data.
Preliminaries
The simulations were performed on Simulation of Urban Mobility (SUMO), which is an
open source traffic simulation package [43]. SUMO allows importing custommaps, user-
defined vehicle trips, and detailed simulation output for every vehicle. A map consisting
of 10 intersections by 10 intersections was constructed to simulate a typical inner-city
topology. The distance between each intersection 400 ft or approximately 122 m. This
gives a block of 400 ft× 400 ft. Themap was then populated with varying number of vehi-
cles generated with random source/destination pairs with the trip defined as the shortest
route between the source and destination. The simulator provides a high degree of con-
figurability for the protocol analysis while providing reports in easy-to-process formats.
Additionally, the simulator provides fine-grain data as information for every vehicle for
every second is saved. We wish to point out that the grid based topology we employ is
widely used for simulation purposes and hence we adopted it in this paper. Extending our
simulations to more complex and realistic topologies is part of future work.
A normal distribution with the current case parameters were used to randomly assign
start and maximum speeds for vehicles. The simulator then creates a simulation report
after completion. The output file includes every vehicle’s speed, position, current road,
position on road, and other data. Then these logs files were parsed to create individual
files for every vehicle containing the timestep, vehicle speed, current position, and current
road at that timestep.
The same data was used to create an output file containing the time a vehicle encoun-
tered a RSU and the speed of that vehicle. Note that RSUswere placed at each intersection.
The simulator was utilized to learn μ∗N and σ ∗N c for various values of number of vehicles
N from 10 to 1000. Unless otherwise stated, the confidence internal was  = 0.05, and
all vehicles within a 0.5 mile range were considered as part of a platoon. All results were
averaged over 50 iterations, with a μ = 35 mph. Due to space limitations, only simulation
data are reported and discussed. However, it should be noted that the analysis data agrees
well with simulations results.
Analysis and simulation results
A road with a length of 10 miles was implemented for this study to allow for sufficient
dispersion among vehicles. Tmin and the average of σ ∗ (denoted as σ ) are determined
from simulation data, as shown in Figure 5. Then they were substituted in Equation 3
to determine the expected number of vehicles in the downstream platoon. As the num-
ber of vehicles increase, the trend remains the same. This sufficiently demonstrates the
fidelity of the simulation environment in conducting further investigations. The trend
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Figure 5 Comparing platoon dispersion theory with simulations. Graph of the expected results from the
platoon dispersion model along with the simulation calculated results.
also remains for road segments of different lengths, which are not reported due to space
limitations.
Figure 6 illustrates the basic features of our protocol, when the number of vehicles in
upstreamplatoon nu = 50. The Y-axis denotes the detection time, or number of RSUs tra-
versed before a detection of Sybil detection is made. In this case, σ ∗ is constant and fixed
as 1.0. When μ∗ increases, Sybil attacks are detected faster. This high value of μ∗ causes
increased dispersion which increases the chances of detecting anomalous platoons. Also,
varying the percentage of Sybil attackers varies the detection time. When the percent-
age of Sybil attackers increase, anomalous platoons are easier to detect, quickening the
detection time.
Figure 7 illustrates the trend of false negatives in the protocol. The number of vehicles in
upstream platoon is still set as nu = 50, and σ ∗ = 1.0. As μ∗ increases, the false negatives
decreases. Again, the high value of μ∗ increases dispersion and the chances of detecting
anomalous platoons correctly which lowers false negatives. Interestingly, the false nega-
tives rate decreases as the percentage of Sybil attackers increase. As more Sybil attackers
Figure 6 Sybil detection under varying percentage of Sybil vehicles. Chart characterizing at which road
side unit Sybil nodes are detected against the percentage of vehicles classified as Sybil nodes.
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Figure 7 False negatives under varying percentage of Sybil vehicles. Chart detailing the trend of the
number of false negatives as the percentage of Sybil vehicles increases.
leads to increased chances of detecting anomalous dispersion. For the case of Sybil attack-
ers reaching 40% and above, the false negatives completely disappear, demonstrating that
the protocol is robust against increasing degree of Sybil attacks.
In Figure 8, the trend of how increasing number of vehicles affects detection perfor-
mance when the percentage of Sybil vehicles is 10% is shown. The observed trend is
straightforward to interpret. When the number of vehicles decrease, σ ∗ increases. This
causes increased platoon dispersion, thus accelerating the detection rate. When the num-
ber of vehicles increases, roads become congested and degree of dispersion decreases,
causing an increased duration of Sybil detection.
In Figure 9, the trade-off between false negatives and false positives when N = 50,
μ∗ = 2 and σ ∗ = 0.4 is shown. As we can see when the percentage of Sybil vehicles is low,
the protocol yields excellent performance in terms of false positives and false negatives.
Though, with increasing attack intensity the performance degrades. The false positive rate
is decided by the parameter , which is user specified. When  is low, the false positive
rate is low and the false negative rate is higher, and vice versa. However, this is also sen-
sitive to the number of Sybil vehicles. How to address this trade-off in practical settings
is the topic of future research. One plan is to integrate long term predictions from RSUs
Figure 8 Sybil detection versus number of vehicles. Chart describing the road side unit Sybil nodes are
detected at with various number of total vehicles.
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Figure 9 False negatives versus false positives. Chart comparing the number of false negatives versus
false positives.
leveraging platoon dispersion with short term prediction models using distributed com-
putation among local vehicles. Also, adapting the protocol to changing road conditions
under traffic dynamics is also part of future research.
Advanced attack model
The previous results and discussions have pertained to a simple attack model where the
Sybil vehicles broadcast all stored pseudonyms during an attack. Once an RSU network
attempts to identify a Sybil attack, the Sybil vehicles may change their message distri-
bution algorithms to avoid detection. The following scenarios describes alternate attack
methods a Sybil vehicle can implement to avoid detection. To determine the robustness
of the proposed protocol, the results of the protocol against different Sybil attack schemes
are presented.
Normal dispersion attack efficiency scenario
The main objective of the attacker is to maintain the efficiency of an attack. Attack effi-
ciency is defined as ratio of Sybil pseudonyms to benign pseudonyms. In other words, the
attack efficiency can be defined as
e = |Vs|/|Vb| · 100%, where
e = the attack efficiency
Vs = set of Sybil pseudonyms
Vb = set of benign pseudonyms
The attacker wants to maintain a high efficiency in order to masquerade Sybil
pseudonyms as benign pseudonyms. For this to become possible, the attacker must
have a priori road information. Say, the attack releases a subset of Vs, called Vs,1, at an
upstream RSU. At the downstream RSU, the attack can release a subset of Vs,1 such that it
appears the platoon dispersed under normal circumstances. The number of pseudonyms
to “disperse” can be derived from the a priori road information and platoon dispersion
theory.
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Normal dispersion attack efficiency results
There are some practical limitations to this attack scenario, which the our protocol
to detect Sybil attacks exploits. In order to have an effective attack, Vs (set of Sybil
identities) must be large compared to Vb (set of benign identities) otherwise the Sybil
attack will have little influence on the benign vehicles. Using the previous example of
Sybil nodes incorrectly reporting road conditions, if exactly 50% of the pseudonyms
were Sybil and reporting false information while the other 50% (benign pseudonyms) are
reporting true information. No decision could be made on what information to believe.
Therefore, an attacker needs more than 50% Sybil pseudonyms to launch an effective
attack.
The attack efficiency, e, is held constant as both the Sybil and benign pseudonyms
are dispersing at the exact same rate, as shown in Figure 10. This effect leads to
an exhaustion point for the Sybil pseudonyms, where there are no more available
pseudonyms to use. The attacker cannot reuse previous pseudonyms for some time
interval as that would trigger an attack detection. Essentialy, reuse of previously dis-
persed pseudonyms leads anomalous behavior and is caught by the protocol. Figure 11
shows at which RSU the attacker has completely exhausted all available pseudonyms.
At that point, the attacker must cease to launch an attack for some time or risk being
detected.
Comparing the results of Figures 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11, for the 10% and 20% Sybil
pseudonyms cases, the attacker actually exhausts all available pseudonyms before the pro-
tocol could even detect an attack. The 30% to 60% cases show pseudonym exhaustion
near the same point of detection, under the simple attack scheme. The highest percent
Sybil pseudonym cases, 70% to 90% show a significant increase of attack duration before
exhaustion. Under the simple attack method, these cases could be identified within 1 RSU.
With the normal dispersion efficiency attack, the pseudonym exhaustion does not occur
until the 6th RSU. This may seem as a favorable scheme for the attacker, but even the best
case of the simple attack method resulting in Sybil attack detection at the same RSU. The
Figure 10 Effiency rate of Sybil attack under Normal Dispersion Efficiency Attack method. The
efficiency rates of Sybil attacks under this method are held constant due to some pseudonyms being
“dispersed” as the attacker moves. Benign vehicles disperse at the same rate leading to the constant efficiency.















Total Dispersion Point for Normal Dispersion Attack
Figure 11 Id. of RSU where attacker exhausts all Sybil pseudonyms. The point of pseudonym exhaustion
under the Normal Dispersion Efficiency Attack scheme. As the percentage of Sybil pseudonyms increase, the
longer it takes for that set to exhaust. In the worst case, all pseudonyms are used by the 6th RSU, showing
comparable performance to the simple attack.
result of this simulation demonstrates the robustness of the protocol to multiple attack
methods.
Minimum efficiency attack scenario
Similar to the Normal Dispersion Efficiency Attack, the Minimum Efficiency Attack
(MEA) attempts to reduce the number of Sybil pseudonyms used while maintaining an
influential attack on a vehicular network. The MEA reduces the number of pseudonyms
used by computing the minimum number needed to gain an influence. The attack mea-
sures the number of vehicles neighboring platoon to obtain Np. In order to influence the
platoon, the attacker needs to use Np + 1 pseudonyms at a minimum. This allows the
attacker to launch a new attack once it knows the attack will be detected. For example
under the 80% Sybil case and 100 vehicles, the attacker knows that Np = 20. The attacker
will then launch 21 of its 80 Sybil pseudonyms to start an advantageous attack. Knowing
the detection scheme, the attacker also knows that this attack will be detected by the fifth
RSU. Consequentially, the attacker retires the previous pseudonyms and launches a new
attack with 21 of the remaining 59 pseudonyms available. This process continues until all
of the attackers Sybil pseudonyms have been exhausted.
Minimum efficiency attack results
As the platoon travels, benign vehicles will disperse but the attack will maintain the orig-
inal pseudonym number of Np + 1. Under this scheme, the attack efficiency of every case
becomes over 100% efficient, as shown in Figure 12. This is ideal for an attacker that
cannot obtainmany pseudonyms from the network. Even the lowest Sybil percentage case
(10%) increases to over 100% attack efficiency. This type is practical and ideal for attack-
ers with very few Sybil pseudonyms. Some cases do not reach the high level of efficiency
as in Normal Dispersion Efficiency attacks, but those cases have an increased duration
before pseudonym exhaustion.
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Figure 12 Minimum Efficient Attack efficiency as platoons reach RSUs further away. As an attack is
launched, the attacker determines the minimum number of Sybil pseudonyms necessary to gain an
advantage in the platoon. As the platoon disperses, the attacker increases its efficiency while minimizing the
number of Sybil pseudonyms needed.
For the cases of less than or equal to 50% Sybil pseudonyms, the attacker cannot launch
an effective attack. Each of these cases can only launch one attack and are detected at the
sixth RSU, as shown in Figure 13. So even though those cases reach an attack efficiency of
over 100%, it is short-term as another attack cannot be launch. The efficiency immediately
drops to below 100% after the fifth RSU when the attacker attempts to launch another
attack. The cause of this drop is the number of Sybil pseudonyms remaining is less than
the number of vehicles in the platoon.
When the Sybil pseudonym percentage reaches 60%, detection time increases dramat-





















Cumulative Minimum Efficient Attack Detection Point
Figure 13 MinimumEfficient Attack detectionpoints as the percentage of Sybil pseudonyms increase.
As the number of Sybil pseudonyms increase, the detection point of an attack increases. In each case, multiple
attacks may be launched so the last detection points are shown.
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pseudonyms, and use fresh pseudonyms from Vs. This action is equivalent to launching
another attack even though the motive may be the same. For example, in the 60% case the
attacker can launch two undetectable attacks until the number of Sybil pseudonyms is less
than the platoon size. At this point, the attacker uses the remaining pseudonyms to launch
a final attack. This attack will be detected in a few RSUs. The summation of total RSUs
traversed before the final detection is shown in Figure 13. The high-percent-Sybil cases
show an apparent defeat in the proposed protocol. This attack scheme could be coun-
tered with the addition of mechanism to detect additions of many vehicle pseudonyms. It
should be noted, though, obtaining such a high percent of Sybil pseudonyms could be a
difficult task in real life.
Conclusions
In this paper, a novel protocol for defending against Sybil attacks in vehicular net-
works is presented. The novelty comes from the fusion of physical phenomena and the
cyber domain to detect Sybil attacks. The combination of physical and cyber environ-
ments makes the protocol effective, practical, efficient, and simple. Additionally, this
paper presents advanced attack methods where the attacker knows the detection scheme
and has a priori road information. The protocol shows similar performance for Normal
Dispersion Efficiency Attack model, while the Minimum Efficiency Attack model may
remain undetected at high Sybil percentages. Future work involves integration of machine
learning algorithms with platoon dispersion and wireless communication support to
not only detect the presence of Sybil attacks, but identifying which are the Sybil
nodes. Advanced collusion attacks to validate our protocol performance are also under
investigation.
Endnotes
aIn a recent 2011 study, platooning was exploited for content management in vehicular
networks [44].
bThe issue of detecting attacks where identities are selectively used (in which case
attack potency is lowered) is part of future work.
cThe subscript N in μ∗N and σ ∗N is dropped in this section for ease of readability.
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